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Abstract 
Environmental concerns and increasing stringency levels of environmental regulations, 
especially in developed countries, has given rise to the debate concerning pollution havens. 
The pollution haven hypothesis argues that differences in environmental policy stringency will 
give economic incentives to firms and industries to move their production to countries with 
more lenient environmental regulations. Even though there exists a vast strand of literature 
investigating this phenomena, their results are inconclusive. 
This thesis empirically studies weather difference in environmental policy stringency has a 
positive effect on foreign direct investment flows between the European OECD and BRIICS 
countries over the time-period 2003 to 2012. Using a fixed effect model, FDI is determined by 
the commonly used knowledge capital specification introduced by Markusen and Maskus 
(2002) in addition to the main independent variable proxied by a new indicator for 
environmental policy stringency. The results of this study shows a significant but weak support 
for the pollution haven hypothesis when considering a time-lag of the EPS-variable by one 
year. 
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1 Introduction 
In order to address the issue of climate change many European countries have tightened their 
environmental regulations to improve their environmental performance. Stricter and stricter 
environmental regulations are likely to not only affect environmental outcomes but also 
economic performance. More stringent policies imply an extra burden for firms, shifting 
resources toward pollution abatement innovations and efficiency improvements making firm-
level productivity growth slow down in the short run. The cost of complying with 
environmental regulations is often seen as damaging the firm’s economic performance and 
global competitiveness. At the same time incentives for innovations and efficiency 
improvements, triggered by environmental regulations, may lead to a higher productivity as 
suggested by the so called Porter Hypothesis (Porter, 1991 and Porter & Van der Linde, 1995). 
The hypothesis that firms and industries move their production abroad to avoid the costs of 
complying with stringent domestic environmental regulations, turning these countries into 
pollution havens, is the so called pollution haven hypothesis. If pollution havens exist this 
would be reflected in changes in international trade patterns as well as foreign direct 
investments (FDI) flows between countries. In the context of FDI, the existence of pollution 
havens imply that firms would move their business or part of their production out of the country 
where the cost of complying with domestic environmental regulations is relatively lower. 
This thesis will empirically investigate the validity of the Pollution haven hypothesis by 
looking at the impact of environmental policy stringency on FDI. More specifically, it will 
examine whether countries with relatively laxer environmental regulations have a competitive 
advantage in attracting  FDI. The main hypothesis of this thesis is that outward FDI-flows will 
increase with the relative differences in stringency between countries. The research question 
will therefore be the following: Do relatively differences in environmental policy stringency 
levels between the European OECD and the BRIICS countries have a significant positive effect 
on FDI-flows? In contrast to earlier studies done on a global level this thesis will look at the 
effect on FDI-flows from the European OECD-countries into the BRIICS using a new proxy 
for environmental policy stringency developed by Botta and Kozluk (2014). This proxy is a 
new composite index which attempts to incorporate the multidimensionality of countries 
environmental policies to a comparable proxy across countries. Moreover, the EPS indicator 
has a broader cross-country and time coverage than other available direct policy measures 
(Botta & Kozluk, 2014). This study can therefore include more countries over a longer time 
period compared to earlier cross-country-studies. So far, only one other study investigating the 
pollution haven hypothesis has used this proxy for environmental policy stringency. However, 
this study by Kozluk and Timiliiotis (2016) looks at trade patterns instead of FDI-flows. This 
makes the EPS indicator the most important novelty of this thesis.   
Investigating the relationship of environmental regulations and FDI between the European 
OECD-countries and the BRIICS specifically, has to my knowledge never been done before. 
FDI outflows have increased considerably over the past decades especially from the OECD 
countries. According to the OECD Co-operation report (2016), FDI-flows from OECD to non-
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OECD countries have more than doubled during the period  2005 to 2014.1 In addition, 
Hoffman et al. (2005) states that investments causing pollution havens are most likely to occur 
in low-income host countries such as the BRIICS because they generally have lower levels of 
policy stringency.  
Further investigating the relationship between environmental policy stringency and industrial 
activity is important for several reasons. First, as stated above FDI-flows have increased 
dramatically over the past decades. If stricter environmental policies have a significant effect 
on FDI-flows this is of great importance for policymakers when designing environmental 
policy packages. Second, the existence of pollution havens may weaken the incentives for 
national policymakers to adopt more stringent environmental policies due to the potential loss 
of competitive advantage in the global market. This could eventually lead to a global decrease 
in environmental standards increasing overall pollution levels, counteracting the effects of 
environmental policies according to Copeland (2008). Third, many existing empirical studies 
have failed to account for issues such as multidimensionality and simultaneity making their 
results biased. To know the real effect more studies must be conducted that incorporates these 
econometric problems.  
To explain the motivation behind FDI this thesis will use the so called knowledge capital (KC) 
model introduced by Markusen and Maskus (2002). The knowledge capital model is a well-
known FDI model with solid theoretical foundations, which not only includes the standard 
gravity variables used in trade-theory such as economic size and distance but also includes 
regulatory quality, difference in skilled labour and whether there exists free trade agreements 
or custom unions between the country pairs.  
The remainder of this thesis is structured as follows. Section 2 presents an overview of previous 
empirical studies on the pollution haven hypothesis. Section 3 describes the conceptual 
framework and the EPS-index. Section 4 describes common econometric issues and suggested 
solutions. Section 5 presents the data used in this thesis. In section 6 the empirical method is 
presented followed by the results and robustness checks in section 7. Finally, section 8 gives 
an analyses of the results and section 9 concludes.  
1 See the Appendix for a graphic overview of total FDI-flows in million US dollars from the European 
OECD to BRIICS countries between 2003 and 2011. 
 3 
2 Literature review 
Pollution havens and the linkage between FDI and environmental regulations have been widely 
studied around the world in many different contexts. However, so far, the empirical evidence 
of these studies has been mixed. This section of the thesis summarises the empirical evidence 
from earlier literature on the effect of environmental regulations on FDI and trade flows and 
presents possible explanations to the mixed outcomes in the literature.  
Kellenberg (2009) tests the pollution haven hypothesis on trade flows using a new dataset on 
the stringency and enforcement of environmental policy in a cross-country context, accounting 
for the endogenous determination of income and strategic environment and trade policy. The 
empirical results show a robust positive confirmation of a pollution haven effect. Unlike many 
earlier studies, Kellenberg accounts for the endogeneity of environment and other trade 
policies. In contrast Kozluk and Timilotis (2016) find that environmental policies are not a 
major driver of international trade patterns. They study how exports are related to national 
environmental policies by using a gravity model of bilateral trade in manufacturing industries 
for selected OECD and BRIICS countries between 1990 and 2000. As a proxy for 
environmental policy stringency the use a composite index constructed by the OECD - the EPS 
index. To control for endogeneity they introduce lagged values of countries corruption, income, 
urbanization and education.  
More relevant for this study is the literature that focuses on the motion of capital, also known 
as FDI. Wagner and Timmins (2009) test the pollution haven hypothesis using panel data on 
outward FDI-flows of various industries in the German manufacturing sector. When 
accounting for econometric issues such as FDI agglomeration and unobserved heterogeneity 
they find robust evidence of a pollution haven effect for the chemical industry. Kalamova and 
Johnstone (2011) empirically study FDI-flows from developed source countries to developing 
host countries and find statistically significant but weak support for the existence of pollution 
havens.  Kukenova and Monteiro (2008) examine the effect of differences in environmental 
regulations on bilateral FDI-flows in a multi-country setting between 1981 and 2005. After 
accounting for endogeneity and spatial dependence they find a negative relationship between 
FDI and environmental stringency. Cai, X, Lu, Y et al. (2016) investigate whether 
environmental regulation affects inbound FDI by performing a quasi-natural experiment on 
industries in China. They find that tougher environmental regulations lead to less FDI and that 
foreign multinationals from countries with better environmental protections than China are 
insensitive to the tougher environmental regulation, while those from countries with worse 
environmental protections than China show strong negative responses. 
The mixed outcomes in these studies can partly be explained by difficulties in finding a good 
proxy for environmental policy stringency across countries and time, and data and 
methodological problems related to unobserved heterogeneity and endogeneity (Brunel & 
Levinson, 2013).  This conclusion is also supported by both Rezza (2015) and Jeppson et al. 
(2002) that conduct meta-analyses of earlier literature on the pollution haven hypothesis.  
Because of these challenges, approaches to the pollution haven hypothesis differ significantly 
when it comes to proxies of environmental policy stringency. One of the most common proxies 
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for environmental regulation in empirical research is PACE (pollution abatement control 
expenditures). A proxy such as PACE suffers from identification problems and the fact that it 
can be difficult for respondents of such surveys to accurately allocate expenditures to 
environmental objectives (Brunel and Levinson, 2013). Levinson and Taylor (2008) is one 
example in the literature that uses pollution abatement costs as a proxy for environmental 
policy stringency. They examine the effect of environmental regulations on trade flows 
between U.S., Canada and Mexico for 130 manufacturing industries between 1977 to 1986 
using a multi sector partial equilibrium model. Their results show a positive significant 
relationship between industry pollution abatement cost and net imports into the US from both 
Mexico and Canada.  
Composite indexes are another commonly used proxy. These indexes are meant to summarize 
multidimensional regulations into one comparable proxy to generally apply to entire economies 
in an attempt to solve the multidimensionality issues. They are however at the same time 
criticised of being arbitrary and their magnitudes can be difficult to interpret. Studies that have 
used this type of proxy among others are Kalamova and Johnstone (2011) who uses the WEF-
index created by World Economic Forum, and Kozluk et al. (2016) who uses the new EPS-
index constructed by Botta and Kozluk (2014). The WEF-index is widely used in the literature 
while the EPS index is a recently developed composite index. Other proxies frequently used in 
studies on the pollution haven hypothesis are measures based on pollution and energy use and 
direct assessments of the regulations themselves (Brunel and Levinson, 2013). 
An important econometric issue often ignored in the literature of pollution havens is 
simultaneity bias. Simultaneity bias occurs when the dependent and independent variable in a 
regression simultaneously influences each other and causes biased estimates. Researchers deal 
with this problem mainly in two ways: natural experiments and instrumental variables. Today 
the most common approach is using instrumental variables because of the scarcity of natural 
experiments (Brunel & Levinson, 2013). Millmet and Roy (2015) divide the literature into 
those who use instruments based on lagged variables (Cole & Elliott, 2005; Jug & Mirza, 
2005), those who include instruments based on geographic dispersion of industries (Taylor, 
2008; List et al. 2003) and researchers who use location specific attributes that ranges from per 
capita income to infant mortality and corruption (Xing & Kolstad, 2002; Kellenberg, 2009).  A 
third and more intuitive way to address this issue is to include lagged independent variables. 
Kozluk and Timiliotis (2016) use this approach when controlling for both timing of the effect 
of environmental regulations and endogeneity problems such as simultaneity. Given this 
background I will now turn to the conceptual framework of this thesis.  3 Conceptual framework 
3.1 Environmental regulations and competitiveness  
This section attempts to give a conceptual understanding of the relationship between 
environmental policy stringency and competitiveness. It discusses the theory behind the 
pollution haven hypothesis and its opposite the Porter hypothesis and explains the KC model 
and the theory behind FDI. 
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The main goal of environmental polices is to improve environmental outcomes driven by 
mitigating the possible negative impacts of climate change. However, the traditional neo-
classical view is that productivity is disadvantaged because environmental regulations such as 
technological standards, environmental taxes or tradable emissions force firms to reallocate 
labour and capital towards research and innovation to meet new demands (Ambec et al., 2013). 
Except from direct costs caused by reallocation, firms might also experience indirect costs 
through increases in input prices in the industries affected by regulations (Barbara and 
McConnell, 1990).  
On the other hand, Porter (1991) suggests that “the right kind” of environmental policies 
triggers innovation making production processes and products more efficient and in that way 
improve firm’s business performance. Firms and industries face market imperfections, such as 
asymmetric information, organizational sluggishness or control problems (Ambec et al., 2013). 
Stringent and well-designed environmental regulations will according to Porter push firms to 
overcome some of these market failures and to pursue otherwise neglected investment 
opportunities. The key mechanism is that regulations promote innovation intended to lowering 
the cost of compliance. This will in turn increase resource efficiency and product value, offset 
compliance costs and improve firm’s productivity. In this perspective environmental 
regulations are seen as a “win-win” strategy leading to better environmental quality and higher 
firm productivity (Porter, 1991 and Porter& Van der Linde, 1995).  
This thesis focuses on the opposite effect of the porter hypothesis which has given rise to the 
pollution haven hypothesis that stricter environmental regulations affect firm and industry 
competiveness negatively in line with traditional neo-classical view described earlier. If 
ambitious environmental policies will negatively affect firm’s competiveness this will be 
shown in lower exports and a gradual movement of production abroad where there are laxer 
environmental regulations. Nevertheless, researchers have not yet come to a conclusion about 
the existence of pollution havens. According to Söderholm (2012), to know the real effect of 
strict environmental regulations on competitiveness it is important to understand how different 
environmental regulations affect different firms and industries and in what way they are able 
to pass on the cost of complying to the consumers. Söderholm also concludes that most 
negative effects of environmental regulations on industrial competitiveness arise in the short 
or medium-term before the firm has had time to adapt to the new technology acquired. It is 
therefore important that environmental policies give clear incentives and time to adapt to 
environmental standards. 
3.2 The knowledge-capital model  
The FDI model used in this study is the knowledge-capital (KC) model presented by Markusen 
& Maskus (2002). This model is based on the standard gravity model often used in trade theory 
and combines both vertical and horizontal motives for direct investments, allowing firms the 
options of building multiple plants in many different locations (horizontal firms) or 
geographically separating headquarters from a single plant (vertical firms).  Further the model 
assumes that: 1) it is possible to geographically separate services referred to as knowledge 
based and knowledge generating activities such as R&D from production and supply these 
services to production facilities at a low cost.  2) These knowledge-based services are skilled-
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labor- intensive relative to production. 3) Type of services defined in the first assumption have 
joint input characteristic in that they can be used simultaneously by multiple production 
facilities (Markusen, 2002). Together the two first assumptions allow for vertical 
MNE(multinational enterprise) activities, implying that R&D is located where skilled labor is 
available at low cost but production location will be close to cheap unskilled labor. Production 
is also performed where firms can exploit economies of scale in production plants. The third 
assumption allows for scale economies at firm level and gives incentive for horizontal 
multinational activity. 
The empirical model of the KC-framework tries to explain the motivations behind FDI 
decisions and the choice of investments type by including different measures of economic 
conditions such as difference in size between the source and host country and regulatory quality 
in the host country. Earlier studies have found weak or mixed evidence on the validity of the 
KC model. The results are mostly coming from the weak support for the vertical part of the 
model (they find weak support that FDI may take place in order to benefit from factor 
endowment differences across countries.) However, Braconier et al. (2005) investigates the 
source of heterogeneity of the evidence and finds strong support for the KC model. They 
conclude that the model seems to fit the data on FDI well. Their results provide a strong support 
for the KC model as characterizing the overall pattern of world FDI activity. 
3.3 The EPS index 
As mentioned before there is a vast number of different proxies for environmental regulations 
used in earlier empirical research. The analysis in this study is based on a new composite index 
of environmental policy stringency (EPS) developed by the OECD (Botta and Kozluk, 2014). 
The EPS index covers 28 OECD and 6 BRIICS countries for the period 1990-2012 and is a 
new internationally comparable proxy for environmental regulations. The main advantage of 
this new indicator is that it is based on actual policies, meaning that it tries to capture the the 
multidimensionality of environmental policies and making it more comparable between 
countries. Stringency is defined as the degree to which environmental policies put an explicit 
or implicit price on polluting or environmentally harmful behavior. The indicator ranges from 
0 to 6 with higher numbers associated with more stringent environmental policies.   
The EPS index covers 14 different environmental policy instruments mainly focused on the 
environmental policy areas, air and climate. This means it overlooks other important areas such 
as water, biodiversity, natural resources or waste. Also soft policies such as tax incentives for 
environmental friendly investment, land use regulation, labelling obligations and voluntary 
approaches has been ignored because of the difficulty in assessing and comparing stringency 
with these types of instruments. However, testing the EPS index Botta and Kozluk (2014) 
conclude that while the EPS indicator is not perfect it can provide a basis for cross-country 
analysis. The overall structure of the EPS index is presented in Figure 1.  
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Figure 1.Overall structure of the EPS-index. Source: Botta & Kozluk (2014) 
 
Among other robustness tests, Botta and Kozluk (2014) looks at the correlation between the 
EPS-indicator and other common proxies used. Their results show highly significant 
correlations with many other measures of stringency supporting the confidence in the EPS-
indicator. Part of their results is presented in table 1. Figure 2 shows the average values of the 
environmental policy stringency in selected countries used in this thesis. As predicted 
stringency is higher in the European OECD countries compared to the BRIICS.  
 
Table 1. Correlation between the EPS-indicator and common used measures of environmental policy 
stringency. Spearman rank over maximum available sample. Source: Brochure from OECD.org; How 
stringent are environmental policies?. 
 
Note: ***, **, * denote significance at 99%, 95% and 90% respectively 
 
 
 
EPS measure Correlation with EPS 
Sample 
characteristics 
Original EPS 0.92*** OECD-countries only, 1990-2012 
World economic 
forum’s executive 
opinion survey 
0.50*** 
OECD countries 
and BRICCS, 
1990-2012 
Energy price(Sato 
et al.2015) 0.50*** 
OECD countries 
and BRIICS, 
1990-2012 
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 Figure 2. Environmental policy stringency in OECD and BRIICS countries. Source: OECD database 
 
 
4 Econometric issues 
The existing literature has been unable to convincingly prove the empirical validity of the 
pollution haven hypothesis mainly because of the challenges of finding a good proxy for 
environmental policy and dealing with important econometric issues such as unobserved 
heterogeneity and the fact that environmental regulations and FDI may be endogenous to each 
other (Brunel & Levinson, 2013). This section presents the most important econometric 
problems faced by researchers when empirically testing the pollution haven hypothesis.  
4.1 Simultaneity 
The possibility that FDI can have environmental consequences and environmental policy can 
have consequences for FDI is known as simultaneity bias and is not an easy violation to deal 
with. This means that environmental regulations can affect FDI due to for example increasing 
abatement costs. At the same time, as direct investments of polluting industries increase in a 
country, overall pollution levels will also increase which can affect the level of stringency of 
the countries environmental regulations. A possible solution is to use an Instrumental Variable 
(IV)approach. However, for the IV approach to work we need to find a genuinely exogenous 
instrument that strongly correlates with the potentially endogenous regressor and only 
influences the dependent variable through the independent variable which is very difficult. An 
instrumental variable approach is only good if there exists a credible instrument and is therefore 
a very challenging method to use.  
Another way to approach this problem is to include lagged values of the suspect endogenous 
variable. The intuition behind lagged variables is that although current values of EPS might be 
endogenous to FDI, past values of EPS might not be subject to the same problem. Even though 
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this is a commonly used method, including lagged independent variables might still cause 
inconsistent estimates due to serial correlation (Millimet & Roy, 2015).  
4.2 Unobserved heterogeneity 
Unobserved heterogeneity refers to unobserved industry or country characteristics, which are 
likely to be correlated with strict regulations and FDI. If these unobserved variables are omitted 
in a simple cross-sectional model, this will produce inconsistent and biased results, which 
cannot be meaningfully interpreted. One solution to this problem would be to use panel data, 
with time variation, and incorporate country or industry-specific fixed effects (Brunnermeier 
& Levinson, 2004). 
4.3 Multidimensionality 
Finding a proxy that can represent environmental policy stringency is difficult (Levinson & 
Taylor, 2008). Environmental regulations are complex and multidimensional due to the fact 
that countries have different policy portfolios which need to be incorporated in the indicator to 
avoid biased estimates. In addition to multidimensionality, sampling and identification 
problems may arise. When policies themselves may be driven by the sample of industries that 
are subjected to policies, this is called sampling. Identification is the difficulty in properly 
measuring to which extent the expected consequences of stricter regulations can be truly 
attributed to environmental policy stringency (Botta and Kozluk, 2014). 5 Data 
This study analyzes outward FDI-flows from the European OECD countries (Austria, Belgium, 
Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, 
Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Slovak republic, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey and the 
UK) into the BRIICS (Brazil, Russian Federation, India, Indonesia, China and South Africa) 
countries. The FDI dataset is an unbalanced panel of yearly data obtained from the OECD-
database is in millions of US dollars and ranges from 2003-2012.  FDI-flows are widely used 
as a proxy for multinational enterprise (MNE) activity. A recent study by Wacker (2016), 
investigating measures of MNE activity concludes that FDI is a good proxy for measuring most 
real economic activities of multinational firms. There are some FDI observations missing in 
the dataset. Because these observations are such a small fraction (only about 5%) of the total 
observations in the dataset, these missing values will be dropped from the sample using pair-
wise deletion with motivation that the sample size still have enough statistical power.  
The data for environmental policy stringency used for the analyses is secondary data provided 
by the OECD- database. The EPS index developed by Botta and Kozluk (2014) ranges from 0 
to 6 with higher numbers associated with more stringent environmental policies.  Data for GDP 
and GDP per capita was taken from the world development indicators database. Total GDP and 
GDP per capita is measured in real international dollars with base year 2003. An international 
dollar has the same purchasing power over GDP as the U.S. dollar has in the United States. 
Data for distance between capitals, common language and common border are taken from the 
CEPII database. Distance is measured in km between capitals of the source and host country. 
Rating of regulatory quality in host country comes from Kaufmann et al. (2008) and ranges 
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from -2,5 to 2,5. Higher values correspond to better governance. Information about data for 
free trade agreements and custom unions is own gathering through the WTOs homepage. CO2 
emissions per capita used as an alternative proxy for environmental policy stringency is 
measured in metrics tons per capita and taken from the world development indicator database.  
The following European OECD countries are not included in this study due to missing EPS 
values: Iceland, Estonia, Israel, Slovenia, Luxemburg. In addition Norway was  excluded from 
the sample due to missing FDI-observations. The period 2003-2012 is decided on the basis of 
FDI-data availability. Table 2 below summarizes the data used in this thesis.  
Table 2. Summary statistics. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES nr of 
observations 
mean standard 
deviation 
min max 
      
GDP squared difference 1,108 8.692e+12 1.787e+13 177.0 9.177e+13 
Sum of GDP 1,108 3.056e+06 2.452e+06 324,230 1.213e+07 
EPS difference 1,108 1.755 0.671 -0.208 3.717 
Distance 1,108 7,414 3,003 892.7 12,679 
Regulatory quality 1,108 -0.103 0.350 -0.780 0.780 
Common language 1,108 0.0379 0.191 0 1 
Common border 1,108 0.0181 0.133 0 1 
Customs union 1,108 0 0 0 0 
Free-trade agreement 1,108 0.143 0.350 0 1 
CO2 difference 1,108 2.849 4.794 -9.510 12.27 
Interaction term I 1,108 -3.340e+10 5.240e+10 -2.857e+11 4.870e+10 
Interaction term II 1,108 6.149e+10 5.899e+10 0 3.026e+11 
Interaction term III 1,108 -1.445e+06 2.837e+07 -7.018e+08 0 
Log of FDI 1,108 8.061 0.366 0 10.10 
      
 
6 Empirical method  
In this section the empirical model and a detailed description of the variables included are 
presented. The empirical analysis of FDI-flows between 20 sources countries and 6 host 
countries will be based on the knowledge capital specification explained earlier. The main 
estimated model is: 
 lnFDIijt = β1∑GDP(ij)t + β2(∆GDP(ij)t)2 + β3INT1t + β4INT2t + β5INT3t + β6Distij 
+ β7TradeCostsijt +β8INVCjt + β9∆Stringency(ij)t + αt + γij  + c + εijt 
Where, i and j indicates the source and host country respectively and t stands for years. 
According to Blongien (2003) most FDI-data are highly skewed and a simple way to 
statistically control for this is to log the data. Therefor the dependent variable lnFDI is the 
logarithmic outward FDI-flow from source to host country over time. Because there exist some 
negative values of FDI due to disinvestments made by the source country we first add a 
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constant to the data variables before the natural log transformation (the natural logarithm of 
zero and negative numbers is undefined). The constant added is equal to the lowest FDI-value 
+ 1 (Mehmetoglu & Jacobsen, 2016). 
∆Stringency(ij)t is the main explanatory variable and represent the differences in environmental 
policy stringency between the source and host country. As environmental policy stringency in 
the source country increases relative to the host country, FDI-flows from the source country 
are expected to increase as a host country with relatively low environmental policy stringency 
is expected to attract flows of FDI. In addition, the variables from the KC-model describing 
FDI will serve as controls.  
The two independent variables ∑GDP(ij)t and (∆GDP(ij)t)2 is representing economic size and 
size differences. The sum of GDP represents aggregated economic size of the source and host 
country and the squared difference is reflecting the absolute differences in size between source 
and host countries. The GDP-measures are included because investments are expected to 
increase with size of both source and host country and decrease with an increase in squared 
size differences. 
 The variable ∆Skill is included to capture differences in relative factor endowments between 
source and host country. The theory behind is that when the source country becomes more 
skilled compared to the host country, FDI will increase.  The three interaction terms INT1, 
INT2 and INT3 relates to the different types of production fragmentation. INT1 which is 
expected to be negative, captures vertical productions fragmentation and is equal to ∆Skill* 
∆GDP if ∆Skill > 0, and 0 otherwise. INT2 captures firm motives for horizontal fragmentation 
and is equal to ∆Skill*∑GDP if ∆Skill > 0, 0 otherwise. This term is predicted to have a 
negative sign. The interaction term INT3 also captures horizontal motives and is equal to - 
∆Skill*∑GDP if ∆Skill < 0, 0 otherwise. The third interaction term should have a negative sign 
because outward investment activity falls as the source country becomes more unskilled-labor 
abundant.  
INVCjt is representing investment conditions in the host country measured by regulatory 
quality. Good regulatory quality in the host country is expected to increase investments and 
have positive effect. TradeCostsijt is the costs of trading between source and host countries and 
measured by international barriers resulting from sharing or not sharing the same language, 
border, belonging to the same customs union or free trade agreement. An increase in investment 
costs are expected to decrease the amount of FDI into the host country. To capture the closeness 
to customers the variable distance is included. As distance increase, FDI is expected to 
decrease.  A variable description with data source and predicted signs is found in table 11.1 in 
the Appendix. The description of variables is taken directly from Markusen and Maskus (2002) 
and Carr et al. (2001). 
 In the first step a simple pooled OLS-regression is performed that regresses the logarithmic 
FDI on the differences in environmental stringency and the rest of the independent variables 
from the KC model described above. To account for the possibility that environmental 
regulations will affect FDI with a delay, lagged variables of environmental policy stringency 
are included in the next step. The exact timing of the effect of environmental policy is difficult 
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to determine and therefor three different lag-structures are tested. The timing can for example 
depend on the choice and design of policy instrument, how they are implemented and 
differences in industry characteristics such as degree of competition and state of technology. 
The lagged variables of environmental policy stringency also help to deal with the simultaneity 
problem that increasing polluting industries in the host country might increase pollution levels 
and thereby urge policy makers to tighten their level of environmental policies. By using time 
lags of the main independent variable it is less likely that the effect of simultaneity in our 
estimation will be an issue (Kozluk & Timiliotis, 2016). 
A problem with the OLS-model is that it does not take into account that countries are 
heterogeneous. Therefor a fixed effects model is used as the main estimated model. Time fixed 
effects αt are included to control for omitted variables that differs across time but are constant 
across entities. Further country-pair fixed effects γij are included to capture unobserved 
characteristics related to each country-pair that differ across country-pair but are constant over 
time (Stock & Watson, 2011).  All variables in the the KC-model that does not vary across 
time will therefor automatically be dropped when regressing the fixed effects model. In all 
estimations clustered standard errors, robust to heteroscedasticity and serial correlation are 
used to control for these potential issues. Finally, εijt is the error term and c the intercept. 7 Empirical results 
7.1 OLS estimations 
This chapter presents the results of the OLS and the fixed effects estimates of the empirical 
model. In the first step an OLS-model was estimated where the natural logarithm of FDI was 
regressed on the environmental policy stringency gap between source and host country 
controlling for all KC variables. The results are presented in table 3. The first column presents 
the results without the lagged values of the main independent variable. In the three remaining 
columns the same OLS regression was performed with lagged values of environmental policy 
stringency in an attempt to control for timing and endogeneity issue presented earlier.  In all 
estimations heteroscedastic robust standard errors were reported to account for potential 
independencies between the FDI-flows into a host country from a certain source country. The 
results suggest that differences in environmental policy stringency have a highly significant 
and positive impact on FDI-outflows from the OECD to the BRIICS countries. The magnitude 
of the coefficient of the main independent variable varies from 0, 0509 to 0, 0752 depending 
on time-lag and they are all significant at a 1% level. In addition, size of host and source 
countries, distance, regulatory quality in the host country and sharing the same language seems 
to be important determinants of FDI.  The results for these variables are all significant at a 1% 
level and consistent over all four estimations with a slightly difference in magnitudes. The R2 
ranges from 0,112 -0,122 which indicates that the model used is note explaining more than 
about 12% of FDI decisions. 
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Table 3.OLS estimates 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES OLS OLS lag1 OLS lag2 OLS lag3 
     
EPS difference 0.0509***    
 (0.0166)    
Sum of GDP 7.15e-08*** 8.13e-08*** 8.33e-08*** 8.55e-08*** 
 (1.79e-08) (1.32e-08) (1.36e-08) (1.43e-08) 
GDP difference  
squared 
-7.99e-15*** -9.05e-15*** -9.38e-15*** -9.64e-15*** 
 (1.91e-15) (1.50e-15) (1.53e-15) (1.58e-15) 
Distance -1.53e-05*** -1.62e-05*** -1.67e-05*** -1.72e-05*** 
 (4.44e-06) (5.26e-06) (5.30e-06) (5.13e-06) 
Regulatory quality 0.169*** 0.174*** 0.182*** 0.185*** 
 (0.0451) (0.0300) (0.0302) (0.0306) 
Common language 0.191*** 0.200*** 0.207*** 0.211*** 
 (0.0560) (0.0605) (0.0611) (0.0621) 
Common border -0.00359 -0.0112 -0.00679 -0.00473 
 (0.0822) (0.0455) (0.0444) (0.0440) 
Customs union = o, - - - - 
     
Free trade agreement -0.0167 -0.00973 -0.0180 -0.0242 
 (0.0442) (0.0270) (0.0274) (0.0281) 
Interaction term I 1.45e-13 -9.25e-14 -1.32e-13 -1.84e-13 
 (5.55e-13) (6.15e-13) (6.20e-13) (6.57e-13) 
Interaction term II 9.40e-13 6.07e-13 5.77e-13 5.19e-13 
 (6.08e-13) (5.53e-13) (5.66e-13) (6.30e-13) 
Interaction term III -4.05e-11 -9.10e-11 -8.21e-11 -5.89e-11 
 (3.70e-10) (5.60e-11) (6.03e-11) (5.28e-11) 
EPSlag1  0.0752***   
  (0.0117)   
EPSlag2   0.0731***  
   (0.0128)  
EPSlag3    0.0749*** 
    (0.0123) 
Constant 7.893*** 7.854*** 7.867*** 7.873*** 
 (0.0485) (0.0402) (0.0410) (0.0514) 
     
Observations 1,138 1,138 1,138 1,138 
R-squared 0.112 0.121 0.121 0.122 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Summarizing the OLS-estimations provides significant results for the main hypothesis that 
increasing environmental policy stringency gap increases FDI-flows from the source to the host 
country. An increase in the environmental policy stringency gap by one unit increases the FDI-
flows from source to host countries with a magnitude of 0,052-0,0752 million US dollars. The 
results are robust to different time-lags of environmental policy stringency.  
7.2 Fixed effects estimations 
Because a simple pooled OLS-model does not account for unobserved heterogeneity, a fixed 
effects model is performed in the next step which is the main empirical specification in this 
thesis. Both time and country-pair-fixed effects are included. The regression is performed on 
the same dataset with the difference that the binary variables for trade costs has been taken out 
of the equation and are instead contributing to the intercept c. As before clustered standard 
errors and lags of environmental policy stringency are included to test the robustness of the 
results.   
The results from the fixed effects estimations differ considerably from the OLS. Environmental 
policy stringency is now negative and insignificant in the main estimation which implies that 
differences between environmental regulations would decrease outward FDI-flows from the 
source country. The magnitude of the EPS difference coefficient is -0, 0140 suggesting that an 
increase in environmental stringency of the source country by one unit, increasing the 
stringency gap by the same amount, would cause a decrease in FDI-flows by 0, 0140 million 
US dollars. In the second estimation, with a one-year time-lag on the EPS variable, the 
stringency gap has positive and weak significant effect on outward FDI-flows. The results 
suggest that an increase in EPS-gap would increase the FDI-flows by 0, 0439 million US 
dollars. The result is significant at the 10% level. For the remaining to estimations including 
the two and three-year lag effect on the EPS-indicator, the results show positive but 
insignificant effect on FDI. 
Overall very few determinants expected to have an impact on FDI show significant results in 
the fixed effects model. Only two variables, Interaction term I and Interaction term II, in the 
KC-model showed a significant result at the 5% level which was consistent over all four 
estimations. The signs of these variables were both negative which also match the prediction. 
This implies that difference in skilled labor in addition to difference in size is an important 
determinant when deciding to invest abroad. The magnitudes of the results are however very 
small and imply that even though they are significant, the impact on FDI will be trivial. 
Looking at the year effects, especially two years, 2008 and 2011, seems to be important, 
consistently over all estimations. Adjusted R2 is approximately 0,220 for all estimations 
indicating a better degree of explanation than the OLS. Concluding, the results for the fixed 
effect model are mixed and shows only a weak support for a pollution haven effect. 
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Table 4. Fixed effect estimations. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES FE FE lag1 FE lag2 FE lag3 
     
EPS difference -0.0140    
 (0.0569)    
Sum of GDP 2.21e-08 4.49e-08 3.24e-08 3.64e-08 
 (6.33e-08) (6.43e-08) (6.18e-08) (6.25e-08) 
GDP difference 
squared 
-5.46e-15 -6.73e-15 -5.95e-15 -6.16e-15 
 (4.25e-15) (4.32e-15) (4.15e-15) (4.20e-15) 
Regulatory quality 0.0394 0.0168 0.0300 0.0239 
 (0.0759) (0.0618) (0.0619) (0.0615) 
Interaction term I -2.92e-11** -2.80e-11** -2.87e-11** -2.84e-11** 
 (1.19e-11) (1.20e-11) (1.20e-11) (1.18e-11) 
Interaction term II -2.62e-11** -2.52e-11** -2.58e-11** -2.54e-11** 
 (1.19e-11) (1.21e-11) (1.21e-11) (1.19e-11) 
Interaction term III -7.01e-11 -1.02e-10* -8.25e-11 -6.59e-11 
 (7.21e-11) (5.57e-11) (5.10e-11) (0) 
year = 2004 0.0357 0.0281 0.0312 0.0291 
 (0.0314) (0.0285) (0.0290) (0.0292) 
year = 2005 0.0597 0.0395 0.0479* 0.0436 
 (0.0427) (0.0268) (0.0263) (0.0270) 
year = 2006 0.0692 0.0257 0.0516* 0.0458 
 (0.0532) (0.0309) (0.0294) (0.0283) 
year = 2007 0.0685 0.0196 0.0472 0.0414 
 (0.0543) (0.0493) (0.0444) (0.0449) 
year = 2008 0.113* 0.0727* 0.0863** 0.0672* 
 (0.0584) (0.0395) (0.0422) (0.0387) 
year = 2009 0.0742 0.0227 0.0499 0.0200 
 (0.0604) (0.0324) (0.0311) (0.0351) 
year = 2010 0.0952** 0.0398 0.0684 0.0511 
 (0.0399) (0.0739) (0.0693) (0.0770) 
year = 2011 0.173*** 0.123*** 0.146*** 0.122*** 
 (0.0590) (0.0347) (0.0392) (0.0375) 
year = 2012 0.109* 0.0613* 0.0838** 0.0554 
 (0.0564) (0.0328) (0.0340) (0.0372) 
EPSlag1  0.0439*   
  (0.0250)   
EPSlag2   0.0153  
   (0.0244)  
EPSlag3    0.0370 
    (0.0254) 
Constant 8.606*** 8.459*** 8.540*** 8.499*** 
 (0.460) (0.430) (0.425) (0.407) 
     
Observations 1,138 1,138 1,138 1,138 
Adjusted R-squared 0.220 0.221 0.220 0.220 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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7.3 Robustness of results 
7.3.1 Alternative proxy 
Even though the EPS-index is highly significantly correlated with other possible proxies for 
environmental policy stringency it is still relevant to test to what extent the results are sensitive 
to the use of a different proxy. The EPS-index has a wider range of countries and years than 
many earlier used proxies which makes it hard to find a credible alternative. Ideally it would 
have been interesting to use another type of composite index such as the WEF-index but due 
to data unavailability CO2 per capita emissions will be used instead. Because environmental 
regulations are designed to reduce emissions such as CO2 it might seem backwards to us it as 
proxy. However, depending on the situation, changes in emissions can be seen in different 
ways. One approach used by Constantini and Crespi (2008) is to look at high levels of emission 
as a measure of stringency because high levels of stringency will force governments to 
introduce stricter environmental policies. The opposite approach is to look at higher pollution 
levels as a measure of relatively lax environmental regulations. The emission levels should be 
lower in a country that is applying stringent and efficient environmental regulations. This thesis 
will follow the approach of Constantini and Crespi (2008), implying that higher CO2 emission 
per capita levels indicates a higher level of environmental policy stringency.  
Intuitively we can see how CO2 emissions can be used as a proxy, however the correlation 
between the EPS-index and CO2   emission per capita is very low, indicating that they seem to 
measure different things. Also, CO 2 emission per capita is a proxy based on environmental 
outcomes and is very different to the policy based EPS- index. A performance based proxy 
often suffers from identifications issues because these kinds of measures does not only reflect 
environmental policy stringency but also other policies, costs of factor production and other 
factors such as technological advancement, market structure etc. The output from the 
estimation should therefore be looked at carefully.2 
The result from the fixed effect estimation with an alternative proxy of environmental policy 
stringency does not change considerably from the fixed effect estimates with the EPS-index. 
The results only differ when it comes to the timing-effect of environmental regulations. In 
difference to the main estimation these results imply that the pollution haven effect is most 
significant when lagging the EPS-variable two years. There is also a small difference in 
magnitudes. The remainder of control variables from the KC-framework does not change 
considerably. Table 5 shows the fixed effects estimations when using CO2 emissions per capita 
as a proxy for environmental policy stringency. 
 
 
  
                                                
2 See Appendix for detailed results from the fixed effect estimation with CO2 as main independent 
variable. 
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Table 5. Fixed effect estimation with an alternative proxy: CO2 emissions per capita. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES FE FE lag1 FE lag2 FE lag3 
     
CO2 difference -0.0122    
 (0.00913)    
Sum of GDP 1.82e-08 1.93e-08 2.03e-09 5.68e-09 
 (6.08e-08) (6.38e-08) (6.20e-08) (6.19e-08) 
GDP difference 
squared 
-5.15e-15 -5.65e-15 -2.94e-15 -2.91e-15 
 (3.98-e-15) (4.83e-15) (4.09e-15) (4.09e-15) 
Regulatory quality 0.0321 0.0441 0.00115 0.00423 
 (0.0612) (0.0721) (0.0598) (0.0584) 
Interaction term I -2.75e-11** -2.73e-11** -2.94e-11** -2.88e-11** 
 (1.21e-11) (1.15e-11) (1.24e-11) (1.24e-11) 
Interaction term II -2.43e-11* -2.41e-11** -2.61e-11** -2.56e-11** 
 (1.24e-11) (1.17e-11) (1.26e-11) (1.26e-11) 
Interactionterm III -6.95e-11 -5.47e-11 -1.31e-10** -1.04e-10** 
 (5.19e-11) (7.77e-11) (5.34e-11) (0) 
year = 2004 0.0290 0.0306 0.0308 0.0270 
 (0.0302) (0.0296) (0.0295) (0.0294) 
year = 2005 0.0467 0.0422 0.0562** 0.0465* 
 (0.0284) (0.0315) (0.0276) (0.0274) 
year = 2006 0.0531* 0.0484 0.0722** 0.0558* 
 (0.0296) (0.0342) (0.0303) (0.0290) 
year = 2007 0.0499 0.0464 0.0729* 0.0617 
 (0.0422) (0.0438) (0.0428) (0.0419) 
year = 2008 0.0927** 0.0891** 0.122*** 0.110*** 
 (0.0385) (0.0430) (0.0377) (0.0372) 
year = 2009 0.0452 0.0351 0.0789** 0.0626** 
 (0.0313) (0.0398) (0.0320) (0.0297) 
year = 2010 0.0633 0.0543 0.106* 0.0842 
 (0.0713) (0.0971) (0.0634) (0.0673) 
year = 2011 0.155*** 0.151*** 0.203*** 0.189*** 
 (0.0383) (0.0411) (0.0437) (0.0406) 
year = 2012 0.0753** 0.0666 0.122*** 0.110*** 
 (0.0348) (0.0430) (0.0363) (0.0358) 
CO2lag1  -0.0210   
  (0.0314)   
CO2lag2   0.0353**  
   (0.0156)  
CO2lag3    0.0253* 
    (0.0142) 
Constant 8.603*** 8.634*** 8.497*** 8.520*** 
 (0.434) (0.461) (0.426) (0.418) 
     
Observations 1,108 1,108 1,108 1,108 
Adjusted R-squared 0.220 0.220 0.221 0.220 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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7.3.2 Lagged values 
The choice of policy instrument and design can affect the timing of which environmental policy 
has an effect on FDI. To account for potential lagged effects and the fact that FDI and 
environmental policy stringency might be endogenous to each other, time-lags for one, two and 
three years were tested in both the OLS and fixed effects model. In the OLS regression the 
results were robust and consistent over all time-lags. In the fixed effects model however the 
effect of the EPS-variables changed from having an insignificant and negative effect to a 
significant and positive effect in the one-year lag regression in line with the theory. The change 
in signs of the main independent variable indicates that the results might still be suffering from 
endogeneity issues. The outcome of the regression using a time-lag of one year is in line with 
the fact that firms are likely to take time to adjust to the changing relative costs induced by 
environmental policies and that investment between countries is not instantaneous.  
7.3.3 Non-linear relationship 
Even though this thesis assumes a strict linear relationship between foreign direct investments 
and environmental policy stringency, the possibility of a non-linear relationship is also tested 
by introducing a squared term of environmental policy stringency. The theory behind is that if 
the stringency of the host country becomes too lax, there is a possibility that the attractiveness 
of investing in that country will decrease. Too lax environmental regulations might work as 
signal to investors that the government is unstable. Once the investment is done in the host 
country, the government can choose how much to demand from the investment returns. 
Incentives for such governmental behavior might be either political or financial and would 
scare potential investors away.  If this theory is accurate, outward FDI-flows will increase with 
the relative difference in stringency up until a certain point, after which it starts to decrease, 
suggesting an inverse U-shaped relationship. The expected sign for the squared term of 
environmental policy stringency should therefore be negative. 
The environmental policy stringency gap could also be increasing because of an increase in 
stringency levels in the source country.  As the stringency levels gets higher and higher it is 
intuitive to think that FDI-flows would increase at a faster rate after a while, causing an 
exponential relationship. If this is true, the expected sign of the squared term should be positive.  
Even in this case the results changes from the ones in the main specification. The estimations 
now show highly significant results for the three year lagged variable of environmental policy 
stringency and its squared term. However, the outcome is not in line with the theories described 
abow since the squared term enters with different signs, both positive and negative over the 
different estimations. Also for the ordinary stringency variable the results are mixed and 
inconclusive. From these results there is no evidence of a nonlinear relationship. Detailed 
results are reported in the Appendix.   
In addition to the robustness checks abow, tests to control for heteroscedasticity and 
multicollinearity are performed. Multicollinearity is a common problem in panel-regression 
and refers to when two or more regressors are highly correlated to each other which can cause 
biased estimates. Heteroscedasticity on the other hand refers non-constant residuals with an 
increasing variance of the residuals over time (Stock and Watson, 2011). The multicollinearity 
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test shows that we should not be worried about multicollinearity in our panel affecting our 
estimates. However, the scatterplot over residuals for the variables indicates that 
heteroscedasticity might be present. Clustered standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity  are 
therefore used in all regressions.3 
In the next part an analysis of the results and robustness test will be done discussing the 
potential flaws and drawbacks in addition to comparing the results with earlier literature. 
8 Analysis/discussion 
The main focus in this study has been to investigate if there exists a pollution haven effect 
between the European OECD and BRIICS countries. The results from the OLS estimation 
supports the pollution haven hypotheses. It suggests that difference in environmental policy 
stringency has a positive effect on foreign direct investment flows from the European OECD 
to the BRIICS countries. However, the OLS-model is vulnerable to omitted variable bias since 
environmental policy stringency is likely to be correlated with many other factors affecting 
FDI-flows. For example, stringency levels might be correlated with unobserved country pair 
specific differences or factors that differ between time periods such as a financial crisis.  
The big difference between the results of the fixed effects estimations which is the main 
specification and the OLS suggests that the OLS estimates indeed are biased.  In contrast to the 
OLS estimations the results from the fixed effect model indicates a weak support for the 
pollution haven hypothesis. The second column regressing environmental stringency with a 
one-year lag shows a significant support for the main hypothesis but only at a 10% level. This 
suggests that increasing differences in tightness of environmental regulations has a lagged 
effect on FDI-flows with one year. Assuming that the results of this study are correct, the weak 
support for the pollution haven hypothesis might be due to the fact that firms are able to 
successfully pass on their costs to customers and is not significantly affected by the tightening 
of regulations. It might also be an indication that firms actually benefit from stricter 
environmental regulations causing an increase in innovation as suggested by the Porter 
hypothesis. The results also suggest that there are more important factors that affect firm 
decisions to invest abroad. According to the evidence from the fixed effects model both vertical 
and horizontal motives is highly significant (even though very small). This means that 
difference in skilled and unskilled labour together with size differences seems to be more 
important determinants of investments flows from the European OECD countries to the 
BRIICS. However, even though a fixed effects model takes care of time and country-pair 
heterogeneity it is not able to control for omitted variables that vary both over time and across 
countries. For this control variables from the KC-model are used. Because the explanatory 
power of the control variables using this data is relatively low (about 22% of total FDI-flows) 
there is a good chance that the fixed effect model still suffers from omitted variable bias which 
can affect the estimates.   
Another explanation for the lack of significant results in the main fixed effects model might be 
due to endogeneity problems explained earlier. Even though using lagged independent 
                                                
3 The results of the multicollinearity test and scatterplot are presented in the Appendix. 
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variables in an attempt to control for simultaneity, it is not an optimal approach and the results 
might still be affected by endogeneity issues. The changes in the estimates from testing 
different time-lags indicate that the main results might still suffer from these kind of problems. 
If there existed a credible instrument for environmental policy stringency more sophisticated 
methods such as an IV regression would have been more optimal to use in attempt to avoid 
these problems.   
As mentioned before multidimensionality is one of the most important issues stated in the 
literature. Even though the EPS-index is intended to capture the real effect of environmental 
policy stringency it is still a proxy. The fact that the EPS-index overlooks some important areas 
such as water, biodiversity, natural resources and waste might have a significant impact on the 
results, hiding the true relationship between investment flows and stringency differences. 
Extending the index to cover more different types of environmental regulations would help to 
make it even more reliable and optimal for these kinds of studies.  
This thesis builds upon the assumption of a linear relationship between difference in 
environmental regulations and FDI. However, in the robustness section a nonlinear relationship 
is tested based upon the possibility that FDI-flows would decrease when stringency of 
regulations in a host country becomes too weak. The results of the robustness test are however 
not in line with what was expected. In contrast to the findings of Kalamova and Johnstone 
(2011), there seems to be no consistent evidence of non-linearity. Even though it seems like a 
reasonable assumption the results are inconclusive which makes it hard to establish if there 
exists a non-linear relationship or not. 
In comparison to this study, Kalamova and Johnstone (2011), who also use a multi-country 
framework to study the effect of relative stringency on FDI, finds highly significant support 
for the pollution haven hypothesis. However, even though their results where statistically 
significant over all estimations they conclude that the effect is relatively small in comparison 
to other factors indicating a weak support in line with this study. Difference in outcomes 
compered to Kalamova and Johnstone (2011) might be due to difference in estimated models 
and econometric techniques. The study also differs in the use of proxy, countries used and 
timeframe compared. According to the literature, different empirical approaches between 
studies on the pollution haven hypothesis seem to be one of the main challenges in addition to 
finding a credible proxy.  
The results from this study are also in line with the results of Kozluk and Timiliotis (2016) 
investigating the pollution haven hypothesis through an international trade perspective.  Similar 
to to this study they use the EPS-index as a proxy for environmental policy stringency. Even 
though they look at international trade patterns instead of FDI, the strong relationship between 
FDI and trade gives some support for the weak results in this thesis. Many other studies have 
found significant results for pollution havens, however the magnitude of the effect are mostly 
very small. This indicates that increasing stringency levels would overall have a very small 
impact and the fear of countries loosing their competitiveness on the global market might be 
overstressed. 
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9 Future research  
This study relies on a two-country framework, ignoring the possibility of a third-country effect 
in FDI decisions. Including third-country effects suggested by Millimet and Roy (2015) would 
have been a good independent variable to use as an extension. The third-country effect captures 
the effect of other neighbourhood host countries to the particular host country. As Millimet and 
Roy (2015) states, ignoring third-country effects can mask the pollution haven effect and cause 
biased results. Because of time-issues this thesis only focused on control- variables included in 
the KC-framework. For further research, however, this would be an interesting factor to 
include. 
In the future it would also be interesting to look at a wider range of countries and an even 
longer time-frame. Extending the EPS-index to a wider range of countries outside the OECD 
and BRIICS could help us to draw more general conclusion of an overall pollution haven effect. 
In addition, improving the EPS index by including more policy instruments and environmental 
areas would be ideal for further research.  It would also be interesting to broaden the research 
using the EPS index and including another type of dependent variable such as firm location 
when investigating the pollution haven effect. Further, more research needs to be done to find 
a more suitable specification that is able to address all the econometric issues that are ignored 
in most of the literature. 
Finally, it is important to remember that this study only looks at the existence of a pollution 
haven effect between the European OECD countries and the BRIICS. To make a more general 
conclusion a setup with countries from different part of the world as host countries would have 
been ideal.  Also the results should be interpreted carefully because the potential of omitted 
variable bias, specification and endogeneity problems.   
10 Conclusion 
The validity of the pollution haven hypothesis has been highly debated over the past decades 
for a good reason. Nevertheless, the literature has not yet come to a conclusion about the true 
relationship between environmental policy stringency and competitiveness. The focus of this 
study has been to empirically investigate the existence of an overall pollution haven effect 
between the European OECD countries and the BRIICS by using a fixed effects model, adding 
to the strand of literature with a multi-country framework. The main contribution to this 
research topic has been the use of a proxy that holds a relatively high degree of 
multidimensionality compared to proxies used in previous literature – the EPS-index. Results 
from the main estimated model show no significant support for a pollution haven effect. 
However, when lagging the environmental policy stringency variable by one year, the results 
change and indicate a weak support for the pollution haven hypothesis in line with the recent 
study done by Kozluk and Timiliotis (2016). The results are robust to an alternative proxy of 
environmental stringency, however it is important to be aware of the limitations of this study 
and the results should be interpreted carefully. Even though this thesis has attempted to avoid 
many of the common econometric problems highlighted in previous literature the results from 
the robustness tests still indicates that the estimates might be biased especially due to 
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endogeneity or omitted variable bias. Future research should therefore be devoted to find better 
solutions to these problems. 
Concluding, it is evident that past empirical studies are inconclusive in finding strong support 
for the pollution haven hypothesis. This can be partly attributed to the complicated nature of 
investigating the question that is often plagued with many econometric issues. This does not 
however disregard the hypothesis, but draws attention to the need for more sophisticated study 
designs or different approaches. Alternatively, it is possible that the pollution haven hypothesis 
does not hold which is also an important finding. Nevertheless, environmental issues are 
becoming more and more important and stringency levels in the future are likely to increase, 
therefore it is important to continue to investigate this relationship to obtain a clear picture of 
the different mechanisms involved. 
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12 Appendix  
12.1 Variable description 
Table 6. Detailed variable description with expected signs. 
 
Variable Definition and source 
Expected 
sign 
 
FDI 
Flow of foreign direct investment from the source to the host country; 
Source: OECD database. 
+ 
 
∆GDP, ∑GDP 
 
 
 
Difference / Sum of gross domestic products between source and host 
country in millions US dollars, current year; Source: World Bank, World 
Development Indicators database (WDI).  
-/+ 
 
∆Skill 
 
Difference of GDP per capita between source and host countries in number 
of years; in the sensitivity analysis we also use the difference of education 
duration; Source: WDI. 
 
+ 
 
Interaction term I 
 
Interaction term equal to ∆Skill* ∆GDP if ∆Skill > 0, and 0 otherwise.  
- 
 
Interaction term II 
 
Interaction term equal to equal to ∆Skill*∑GDP if ∆Skill > 0, 0 otherwise.  
- 
 
Interaction term III 
 
Interaction term equal to - ∆Skill*∑GDP if ∆Skill < 0, 0 otherwise.  
- 
 
Distance 
Distance in km between the capitals of the source and host country; 
Source: Centre d’Etudes Prospectives et d’Informations Internationales 
(CEPII).  
 
- 
 
 
Common border 
 
 
A binary variable equal to 1 if the source and host country share the same 
border and 0 otherwise; Source: CEPII. 
 
+ 
 
Customs union 
 
A binary variable equal to 1 if the source and host countries belong to the 
same customs union and 0 otherwise; Source: World Trade Organization 
(WTO), own compilation. 
 
+ 
 
Common language 
A binary variable equal to 1 if the source and host country share the same 
language and 0 otherwise; Source: CEPII.  
 
+ 
 
Free-trade agreement 
 
A binary variable equal to 1 if the source and host countries belong to the 
same free trade agreement and 0 otherwise; Source: WTO, own 
compilation.  
 
+ 
 
Regulatory quality 
 
Rating of regulatory quality in host country with a range from -2.5 to 2.5; 
Source: Kaufmann et al. (2008).  
 
+ 
∆Environmental 
policy stringency 
Differences of the stringency levels of environmental policy stringency 
between source and host countries. Source: OECD database 
 
+ 
(∆Environmental 
policy stringency)2 
Squared differences of the stringency levels of environmental policy 
stringency between source and host countries. Source: OECD database 
- 
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12.2 List of countries 
Table 7. List of countries used. 
OECD countries  BRIICS countries 
Austria   Slovak republic   Brazil 
Belgium  Spain    Russia  
Czech Republic  Sweden    India 
Denmark  Switzerland   Indonesia 
 Finland  Turkey    China 
France   United Kingdom  South Africa 
Germany 
Greece 
Hungary 
Ireland 
Italy 
 Netherlands 
Poland 
Portugal  
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12.3 Multicollinearity 
To make sure there is no multicollinearity present a VIF test is performed. Most literature 
suggests a VIF value higher than 4 might cause problems in the regression.  Most of the 
independent variables show no indication of multicollinearity as the values are less than four. 
Also their correlation is relatively low as we can see from the correlation table.  Measures 
including GDP or GDP per capita however shows high correlation and VIF value greater than 
4 as expected. The tests indicate that we should not be worried about multicollinearity 
affecting our output.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 8. VIF-test 
Table 9. Correlation table for all independent variables 
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12.4 Heteroscedasticity 
If heteroscedasticity is present, this would cause an upward bias in standard errors. Bias in 
our standard errors will affect our t-values and therefore also our t-test. (checking for 
normality of residuals distributions) Examining figure 2 we se that the the spread of residuals 
indicates that heteroscedasticity might be present. Clustered standard errors robust to both 
heteroskedasticity and serial correlation are therefor used in all the regressions.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Scatterplot of residuals. 
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12.5 Fixed effect estimation including a squared term of EPS difference 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 10. Detailed results from fixed effects estimation including a squared term of environmental policy stringency. 
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12.6 FDI-flows between the European OECD and BRIICS 
 
Figure 4. Development for total FDI-Flows between European OECD and BRIICS countries for chosen years. 
Source: OECD database. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
